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This paper studies the effectiveness of Euro Area (EA) fiscal policy, during the recent 
financial crisis, using an estimated New Keynesian model with a bank. A key dimension of 
policy in the crisis was massive government support for banks—that dimension has so far 
received little attention in the macro literature. We use the estimated model to analyze the 
effects of bank asset losses, of government support for banks, and other fiscal stimulus 
measures, in the EA. Our results suggest that support for banks had a stabilizing effect on EA 
output, consumption and investment. Increased government purchases helped to stabilize 
output, but crowded out consumption. Higher transfers to households had a positive impact 
on private consumption, but a negligible effect on output and investment. Banking shocks 
and increased government spending explain half of the rise in the public debt/GDP ratio since 
the onset of the crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis that erupted in 2007 originated in massive bank losses on US mortgage 
loans. It spread rapidly to the Euro Area (EA) and other parts of the world, and led to the 
worst global recession since the Great Depression. These events were countered by sizable 
fiscal stimulus measures (increased government purchases of goods and services, transfers to 
households, and tax cuts) and massive government support for banks (e.g., purchases of 
‘toxic’ assets and bank recapitalizations by the state). This paper evaluates the efficacy of 
these measures, using a New Keynesian model with a bank. We estimate the model with EU 
data (1995-2011), using Bayesian methods.  
 The key novelty of the study is the quantitative analysis of fiscal policy, in an 
economy in which the health of the banking system is a key determinant of interest rates and 
real activity. We assume a rich fiscal policy setup, with distorting taxes, government 
consumption and investment, and transfers to households and the banking system. The bank 
receives deposits from savers (patient households), and makes loans to impatient households 
who use their house as collateral. The bank also invests in domestic government bonds, and 
in foreign bonds. Importantly, the bank faces a capital requirement: she has to finance a 
fraction of her assets using her own funds (equity). This requirement reflects legal 
requirements and market pressures. In this structure, bank capital is an important state 
variable. A loan default lowers bank capital, which raises the spread between the mortgage 
lending rate and the deposit rate, and leads to a fall in investment, employment and output. 
Government support to banks, modeled here as a public transfer to the bank financed by 
higher taxes, boosts bank capital, lowers spreads, and raises investment and output. 
Investment drops sharply in financial crises. Thus, government support for banks   stabilizes a 
component of aggregate demand that is especially adversely affected by financial crises. By 
contrast, higher government consumption crowds out consumption and investment.  
We use the estimated model to quantify the main drivers of recent business cycle 
fluctuations in the EA economy. Bank losses explain about a quarter of the fall in EA GDP 
and consumption in 2007-09, and more than three-quarters of the fall in private non-
residential investment. Our empirical results suggest that government support for banks 
noticeably dampened the fall in EA GDP, consumption and investment during the crisis. 
Increased government purchases likewise helped to stabilize output, but crowded out 
consumption. Higher transfers to households had a positive impact on private consumption, 
but a negligible effect on output and investment. Banking shocks and increased government 
spending explain half of the 20 percentage point rise in the public debt/GDP ratio since the 
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onset of the crisis. Our model also suggests that a default on sovereign debt held by the 
banking system would disrupt real activity. By contrast, a default on sovereign debt held by 
households is predicted to have a negligible effect on real activity.   
Earlier assessments of fiscal stimulus in the crisis were based on models without 
banks--see, e.g., Coenen et al. (2012), Coenen, Straub and Trabandt (2012), Drautzburg and 
Uhlig (2011) and Forni and Pisani (2011). Those studies concentrated on the effects of 
temporary fiscal impulses in the form of increased government purchases of goods and 
services, transfers to households, and tax cuts. By contrast, the macro-economic effects of the 
government measures to support banks have, so far, received little attention in the literature. 
Our paper seeks to fill this gap. The paper also contributes to the literature, by estimating a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a rich fiscal policy set-up—
whereas the related macro literature has traditionally relied on calibrated models.
1
 
Before the financial crisis, standard macro theory largely abstracted from financial 
intermediaries. The crisis has stimulated much research that incorporates banks into DSGE 
models. See, for example, Gerali et al. (2010), Curdia and Woodford (2010), in’t Veld et al. 
(2011), Meh and Moran (2010) and Kollmann et al. (2011). These papers use calibrated 
models, abstract from fiscal policy, and do not analyze government bank support measures.
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A further contribution of the paper here is that it develops a novel specification of the 
banking sector. Previous DSGE models assume that banks only accumulate capital through 
retained earnings, and that banks take deposits from households and lend to the non-financial 
business sector. Yet, in reality, banks can issue equity to raise capital; also, lending to 
households is a key activity of banks--in the EA, bank loans to households exceed loans to 
non-financial firms. Our model thus assumes a bank that is owned by an entrepreneur who 
also owns the production sector--the entrepreneur can use his non-bank wealth to raise the 
bank’s capital. Also, the bank lends to households.3 We show that, although the bank can 
issue equity, loan default shocks have a persistent negative effect on real activity.  
                                               
1
 Ratto et al. (2009), Forni et al. (2009), Leeper et al. (2010), Leeper et al. (2011), Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) 
and Coenen, Straub and Trabandt (2012) likewise estimate DSGE models with fiscal policy.   
2 Gerali et al.  (2010) also estimate a DSGE model with a banking sector. Roeger and in’t Veld (2012) study the 
effect of government support for banks, in stylized RBC models. So do Sandri and Valencia (2012), Bianchi 
(2012) and Haavio et al. (2012) who focus on normative issues (we learnt about these papers after the research 
here was completed).  
3 Setups with patient savers and impatient collateral-constrained borrowers have also been considered by 
Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010), but those authors assumed direct lending (no bank) between  
these classes of households.   
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Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 describes the numerical solution and the 
econometric approach. Section 4 discusses properties of the estimated model. Section 5 
concludes.  
2. The economy 
We consider an open economy with a representative entrepreneur, two workers and a 
government. The entrepreneur owns a bank, an intermediate good producing firm, and a 
distribution firm. The two workers provide labor services to the intermediate good 
producing firm, and accumulate housing capital. The workers have different rates of time 
preference. In equilibrium, the more patient worker holds financial assets (bank deposits and 
government debt). The other (impatient) worker borrows from the bank, using her housing 
capital as collateral. The bank thus acts as an intermediary between the patient worker and the 
impatient worker. The bank also holds bonds issued by the domestic government and by the 
rest of the word. Importantly, the bank faces a capital constraint—a fraction of her assets has 
to be financed using bank capital. The distribution firm sells the intermediate output to firms 
that aggregate locally produced and imported intermediates into a homogeneous final good. 
The final good is used for private and public consumption and investment, and exported. The 
distribution firm has market power. Wages are set by a monopolistic labor union. Nominal 
prices charged by the distribution firm and nominal wages are sticky. All other markets are 
competitive. The government levies distorting taxes, and issues debt; a monetary authority 
sets the nominal interest rate on government debt. We next present the key aspects of agents’ 
decision problems.
4
 
 
2.1. Patient and impatient workers 
Workers’ welfare depends on final good consumption, hours worked and on their stock of 
housing capital. There is habit formation for each of these choice variables.  Worker s=i,p    
(i: impatient; p: patient) maximizes 
                 10 1 1 110( ) ln( ) ln( ) { }
ss t s C s s s H s s N s
t t t t t tt
E C h C H h H N h N  
 
  
      
with 0 , , 1C H Nh h h   and , , 0s s   . stC  and 
s
tN   are the consumption and labor hours of 
worker s=i,p,  in period t, while 1
s
tH   is  her stock of housing capital at the end of period t. 
                                               
4 For the sake or brevity, the following presentation abstracts from adjustment costs (for labor and capital) and 
variable capital utilization rates that are assumed in the estimated model. These features help to better capture 
the data dynamics. The detailed model is available on request.  
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The subjective discount factors are
i  and p  with .i p   We assume the rate of time 
preference of impatient worker is sufficiently high so that, in equilibrium, only the patient 
worker holds financial assets (bank deposits and government bonds), while the impatient 
worker borrows from the bank. 
5
 The law of motion of the housing stock of worker s=i,p is: 
1 (1 ) ,
s s H s
t t H t tH H J      where 0 1H   is the depreciation rate of housing, while
s
tJ is the 
worker’s gross housing investment, in final good units.
H
t is an exogenous shock to the 
efficiency of housing investment. In period t, worker s  has a real tax liability (net of transfers 
received from the government) of 
s
tT (see below). 
The period t budget constraint of the patient worker is 
                            
,
1 1 ,
p p p p D p D G p p
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tD B PT PJ PC D R B R P w N           
where tw is the nominal wage rate, while tP  is the final good price. tD  and 
p
tB  are the bank 
deposits and government bonds held by that worker at the end of period t-1. 
D
tR  is the gross 
interest rates on deposits and government bonds.
6
  All domestic financial assets/liabilities are 
expressed in domestic currency units, and all interest rates are nominal rates. We allow for 
the possibility of a (partial) default on sovereign debt. This is modeled by assuming that, in 
period t, the government defaults by an exogenous real amount 
,G p
t  on the amount
p
t tB R   
that it owes to the patient worker.  
The budget constraint of the impatient worker is 
                               1 ,
L L i i i i
t t t t t t t t t t t t tL R P PT PJ PC L w N        
where tL is a one-period bank loan received in period t-1. 
L
tR  is the gross loan rate between  
t-1 and t. At t, the impatient worker defaults by an exogenous real amount 
L
t  on the amount 
that she owes to the bank, .Lt tL R  The impatient worker uses her housing stock as collateral. 
Maximum borrowing at t is given by the value of that housing stock, times an exogenous 
loan-to-value ratio t  imposed by the bank. The impatient worker thus faces the collateral 
constraint  1 1,
i H i
t t t tL P H   where /
H H
t t tP P   is the price of one unit of housing capital. We 
                                               
5
Both workers have the same habit parameters ( , , )C H Hh h h  and the same long-run Frisch labor supply elasticity, 
1/ .  By contrast, the utility weights of housing and labor ( , )s s   differ across workers—those weights are set 
to target the steady state consumption shares of the two workers, and the ratio of residential investment to GDP.  
6As sovereign default is modeled in a lump-sum fashion (see below), the patient worker is indifferent between 
holding deposits and government bonds; thus the interest rates on these assets are equalized.  
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assume that 
i  and t  are sufficiently low so that the impatient worker always borrows the 
maximum amount.  
 
2.2. The entrepreneur 
The entrepreneur maximizes  
                                 0 1 10( ) ln( ) ln( )
E t E C E E H E
t t t tt
E C h C H h H 

 
   , 
where 
E
tC and 1
E
tH   are her consumption and housing stock, respectively. The entrepreneur’s 
subjective discount factor lies between those of the two workers: .i E p     This ensures 
that the steady state interest rate on loans exceeds the deposit rate. The law of motion of the 
entrepreneur’s housing stock is 1 (1 ) ,
E E H E
t t H t tH H J      where
E
tJ  is her housing investment 
(in final good units). The entrepreneur’s period t budget constraint is 
E E
t t t tPC PJ   
,I D B Et t t t td d d PT   where 
E
tT  is the entrepreneur’s real tax liability, while ,
I D
t td d  and
B
td  are 
the dividend of the intermediate good produce, the distributor and the bank, respectively. 
Each of these three business entities maximizes the present values of profits, discounting 
future profits using the entrepreneur’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.   
 
2.2.1. The intermediate good producing firm 
The firm has the technology 
1
( ) ,GGt t t t tY K K N
 

  0,0 1,G     where ,t tY K  and tN  are 
the production of a homogenous intermediate good, and the firm’s capital and labor inputs, 
respectively. tK  corresponds to the private non-residential capital stock of this economy 
(none of the other firms uses physical capital). 0t   is an exogenous random productivity 
parameter and
G
tK is the government capital stock (e.g., infrastructure facilities). Government 
capital is assumed, because the fiscal stimulus measures during the crisis included increased 
government investment. We assume that an increase in government capital raises private 
output, as a vast theoretical and empirical literature points to productive effects of 
government capital.
7
  
The law of motion of the private capital stock is: 1 (1 ) ,t t t tK K I      where 0 1   
is the capital depreciation rate; tI  is real gross non-residential investment, in final good units. 
                                               
7 See, e.g., Aschauer (1980), Barro (1990), Turnovsky (1999) and Basu and Kollmann (2012). Coenen, Straub 
and Trabandt (2012) also analyze the effects of fiscal stimulus during the crisis, using a model with productive 
government investment. 
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t  is an exogenous investment efficiency parameter.  ln( )t  and ln( )t  follow random walks 
with positive drift. All other exogenous variables in this model follow univariate stationary 
AR(1) processes. The growth of potential real output is driven by the ‘total’ technology trend 
1/(1 ) /(1 )
( ) ( ) ,G Gt t tZ
          where 0  is a scale factor that we set so that the ratio of 
real GDP to Z equals unity, in steady state.8 
The intermediate good producer’s period t dividend is: ,I It t t t t t td p Y w N PI    where 
I
tp  is the price of the intermediate good. The following Euler equation characterizes optimal 
accumulation of non-residential capital, from the entrepreneur’s viewpoint: , 1 1 1,
K
t t t tE R     
where 1 1 1 1 1 1[( / ) / (1 )/ ]
K I
t t t t t t tR p P Y K              is the real gross return on private non-
residential investment, while , 1t t  is the entrepreneur’s intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitution.
9
, 1 1 1
K
t t t tE R     and the bank’s Euler equations for bank loans and deposits (see 
below), imply that the expected return on non-residential investment 1
K
t tE R   is closely tied to 
loan and deposit rates, which implies that non-residential investment is likewise closely 
related to these interest rates. Empirically, non-residential investment is much less closely 
related to interest rates. The estimated model thus assumes that the Euler equation for non-
residential capital is disturbed by a stationary exogenous random variable 1 ,t  where  t  
has an unconditional mean of zero ( 0) :tE   
                                            , 1 1(1 ) 1.
K
t t t t tE R                                                           (1) 
t  can be interpreted as reflecting a bias in the entrepreneur’s date t forecast of the physical 
investment return 1.
K
tR 
10
 
 
 
 
                                               
8 The trend growth of employment is zero, in the model. The long-term growth rate of government capital 
equals that of GDP (see below), while the trend growth of non-residential capital equals the sum of the trend 
growth rates of output and investment efficiency. Thus, the trend growth rate of GDP GDPg is determined by the 
trend growth rates of t  and :t ( ).GDP G GDP GDPg g g g g      Thus ( )/(1 ),GDP Gg g g       which corresponds 
to the trend growth rate of .tZ             
9 We assume that habit formation is ‘external’, which implies  , 1 1( ) ( )/( )
E s E C E E C E
t t s t t t s t sC h C C h C         for s≥0. 
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2.2.2. The distribution firm 
The distribution firm costlessly ‘differentiates’ the homogeneous intermediate good into a 
continuum of ‘varieties’ indexed by [0,1].s  These varieties are sold to the final good sector. 
The final good sector bundles the varieties into a (domestically produced) composite good 
1
( 1)/ /( 1)
0
{ ( ) }st t
s
Q q ds    

   where
s
ty  is the amount of variety, and 1  is the substitution 
elasticity. Demand for variety s is ( / ) ,s s Qt t t tq p P Q
  where stp  is the price of variety s, 
while
1 1/(1 ){ ( ) }D st tP p ds
     is the price (marginal cost) of the domestic composite good. The 
dividend of the distributor is ,D s s It t t t td p q ds p Y   with .
s
t tY q ds  The distributor acts as a 
monopolist, and sets prices for each variety subject to Calvo (1983) price adjustment 
schemes. This implies that the (log) inflation rate of the domestically produced composite 
good, 1ln( / ),
D D D
t t tP P  obeys an expectational Phillips curve, up to a (log-) linear 
approximation (e.g., Erceg et al. (2000)):  
                                   11( ) ( / )
D D E D D I D
t t t D t tE p P

     

     ,   
where 
D  is the steady state inflation rate of the composite good, and 0D   is a coefficient 
that depends on the cost of changing prices.
11
   
 
2.2.3. The bank 
The paper assumes a representative bank.
12
  In addition to her deposit and loan activities, the 
bank invests in one-period government bonds and in an internationally traded bond 
denominated in foreign currency. The bank’s holdings of government and foreign bonds at 
the end of period t are denoted by 1
B
tB   and 1tF   respectively. Bank capital at the end of 
period t is hence 1 1 1 1,
B
t t t t tL B e F D      where te  is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the 
domestic currency price of foreign currency. The bank faces a capital requirement: an 
exogenous fraction   of her assets has to be financed using bank capital. This constraint 
                                                                                                                                                  
10 Assume that the entrepreneur’s beliefs at t about  1
K
tR   are given by a probability density function, ,
s
tf  that 
differs from the true pdf, ,tf by a factor 1/(1 ) :t 1 1( , ) ( /(1 ), )/(1 )
s K K
t t t t t t tf R f R         where t  is any other 
random variable. The entrepreneur’s Euler equation for non-residential capital is then given by (1).  
11 ( 1)/   is the inverse of the steady state mark-up factor charged by the distribution firm.  
12 The interbank market is thus not modeled here. Frictions in that market would matter for aggregate activity if 
they affected the total flow of funds from savers to borrowers. The model here generates realistic empirical 
fluctuations in the loan rate spread and in the total volume of intermediation. 
 9 
reflects legal requirement and market pressures.
13
 The bank can deviate from the required 
capital ratio, but this is costly. Let  
                                      1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ( ))/
B B
t t t t t t t t t t tx L B e F D L B e F P                
denote the bank’s real excess capital (gap between actual capital and the target capital). The 
bank bears a real cost t  in period t (in final good units) if her capital differs from the target:  
                                    
21
2 ( ) / ,
x x
t t tx Z    with 0
x  ,  
where tZ  is the ‘total’ productivity trend (see above).  
To pin down the bank’s bond portfolio, we assume that at date t the bank bears real 
costs 
21
12 ( / ) /
B B B B
t t t t tB P Z Z      and 
21
12 ( / ) /
F F F
t t t t t te F P Z Z      (with , , ,
B F B    
0)F   when her (real) holdings of domestic and foreign bonds deviate from the targets 
B
tZ and ,
F
tZ  respectively.
14
  At date t, the bank also bears a real operating cost 
1 1 1( )/ ,t t t t tL e F D P       where 0  is a constant.    
In period t, the impatient household and the foreign bond issuer default by exogenous 
real amounts 0Lt   and 0
F
t   on the sums owed to the bank ( , ).
L F
t t t t tR L e R F  The total loan 
loss ( )/L Ft t tZ   follows an AR(1) process. Foreign losses are assumed to represent 50% of 
total losses, consistent with estimates of the geographic origin of the losses suffered by EA 
banks, during the global financial crisis (see IMF (2010)).   
When a loan loss occurs, the government may provide financial assistance to the 
bank, in the form of a subsidy BtS  (E.g., when the bank faces loan default, the government 
may purchase maturing loans from the bank, at face value-- BtS  then is the difference between 
the face value and the fair value of the loans.)  
However, the government itself may become a threat to the bank’s health, by 
defaulting on its debt. Let 
, 0G bt   be the (real) amount by which the government defaults 
on the amount owed to the bank in period t, .B Bt tR B   
The bank’s period t budget constraint is, hence:   
                1 1 1 1 1 1( )
B x B F B
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tD R L B e F D L e F P P P d                       
                                               
13 Bank capital requirements are often justified as limiting moral hazard in the presence of informational 
frictions and deposit insurance (see Freixas and Rochet (2008)). These issues are not explicitly modelled here. 
Instead, we take the capital requirement as given, and focus on its macroeconomic effects.  
14 Positive bond holdings can be justified by the idea that these bonds provide liquidity services. See Woodford 
(1980) for a model in which public debt provides liquidity services to the private agents.  
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                                                   ,1 ,
L L B G B F F B
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tD L R P B R P e F R P PS                         
where Btd  is the bank’s dividend, and 
F
tR  is the gross interest rate on the foreign bond.  
 The bank’s Euler equations for deposits and mortgage loans are:  
                                1 1 , 1( / ) 1 / ,
D x
t t t t t t t tR E P P x Z                                              (2) 
                               1 1 , 1( / ) 1 (1 ) / ,
L x
t t t t t t t tR E P P x Z                                            (3) 
(Log-)Linear approximations of (1) and (2) imply that the spread between the expected real 
returns on private non-residential investment and deposits obeys:  
                                          1 1 1( ) /
K D x
t t t t t t t tE R R E x Z           ,                                (4) 
with 1 1ln( / ).t t tP P    
15
 To get an intuition for this expression, assume that the bank increases 
deposits by an amount corresponding to one unit of the final good, in order to increase the 
dividend, and that the entrepreneur uses the higher dividend to increase the production firm’s 
capital stock. This raises the bank’s operating cost by ,  and it lowers the bank’s capital by 
one unit, which increases the bank’s cost 
x
t  by / .
x
t tx Z   (4) shows that, under optimizing 
behavior by the entrepreneur, the expected return on physical investment has to equal the 
entrepreneur’s marginal cost of borrowing via the bank, i.e. the sum of the real interest rate 
on deposits, of the marginal bank operating costs and of the marginal cost of bank leverage, 
/ .x t tx Z   The spread between the real expected return on physical investment and the real 
deposit rate, 1 1 1( ),
K D
t t t t tE R R E     thus has to cover the bank’s marginal operating cost plus 
the marginal cost of leverage (less the Euler equation disturbance, );t  see (4). In what 
follows, we refer to that spread as the ‘non-residential investment (return) spread’.  
Condition (4) is key for understanding the role of the bank capital requirement in the 
transmission of bank balance sheet shocks to real activity. Note that the marginal cost of 
leverage is a decreasing function of the bank’s excess capital (as 0).x   Hence a negative 
shock to bank capital raises the ‘non-residential investment spread’. The simulations 
discussed below show that the rise in the spread is accompanied by a fall in non-residential 
investment, and a reduction in real activity. (In the absence of an operative capital 
requirement, 0,x   the non-residential investment spread is constant, and shocks to bank 
capital have little effect on investment and real activity.) 
                                               
15 The linear approximations discussed in this Section are taken around 1, 0.
K D LR R R x           
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Linear approximations of (2)-(3) show that the spread between the bank loan rate and 
the deposit rate obeys:   
                                               1 1 2 /
L D x
t t t tR R x Z        ,                                                
If the bank raises deposits and loans by one unit of the final good, then her operating cost 
increases by 2 ; excess bank capital falls by ,  which increases the penalty xt  by 
/ .x t tx Z     Optimizing behavior by the entrepreneur requires that the spread between the 
loan rate and the deposit rate 1 1
L D
t tR R   covers the marginal cost 2 /
x
t tx Z     . Hence, the 
loan–deposit rate spread is a decreasing function of the bank’s excess capital.  A negative 
shock to the bank’s (excess) capital thus raises the lending rate spread 1 1;
L D
t tR R  as shown 
below, this is accompanied by a fall in residential investment.  
 The sensitivity of the non-residential investment spread and of the lending rate spread 
to (excess) bank capital hinges on the parameter .x  Note that / ( )t t tx Z cr A   where 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1( )/( )
B B
t t t t T t t t t Tcr L B e F D L B e F            is the bank capital ratio (i.e. the ratio of bank 
equity to bank assets), where A  is the steady state of bank assets (normalized by the total 
technology trend, ).tZ  Thus, a one percentage point rise in the bank capital ratio lowers the 
non-residential investment spread and the lending rate spread by 4 xA  and by 4 xA  
percentage points p.a., respectively. Hence, the ‘non-residential investment spread’ is more 
sensitive than the lending rate spread to changes in the bank capital ratio.  
 
2.3. Wage setting 
We assume a trade union that ‘differentiates’ homogenous labor hours provided by the two 
workers into imperfectly substitutable labor services, and then offers these services to the 
intermediate good-producing firm--the labor input tN  in the producer’s production function 
(see above) is a CES aggregate of these differentiated labor services. The union sets nominal 
wage rates of the differentiated labor services to maximize the sum of the expected life-time 
utilities of the two workers, subject to independent Calvo (1983) wage adjustment schemes 
for each type of differentiated labor (Kollmann (2001, 2002)). This implies that the (log) 
growth rate of the nominal wage rate, 1ln( / ),
w
t t tw w  obeys the following wage Phillips 
curve, up to a (log-)linear approximation (e.g. Erceg et al. (2000)):  
                                            1( )
w w w w w w
t t t w tE z         ,   
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where
w  is a weighted average of the two workers’ discount factors, w  is steady state 
wage inflation, and 0w   is a coefficient that depends on the cost of changing nominal 
wages; 
w
tz  is the gap between a weighted average of workers’ marginal rates of substitution 
between consumption and leisure, and the real wage rate.  
 
2.4. Final good sector 
The final good technology is 
( 1)/ ( 1)1/ 1/ /( 1)[ (1 ) ] ,t t ta Q a M
            with 0 , where t  is 
final good output. tQ  is the CES aggregate of locally produced intermediate good varieties 
described above, and tM  is a homogenous imported intermediate good. 0.5 1a   determines 
the local content of the final good. The Law of One Price holds for the imported good, and 
thus the domestic and foreign currency prices of the imported good are 
*
t te P  and 
*,tP  
respectively.
16
 Perfect competition in the final good market implies that its price, ,tP  equals 
its marginal cost: 
1 * 1 1/(1 )[ ( ) (1 )( ) ] .Dt t t t t tP a P a e P
        The final good is exported, and used 
for domestic consumption and investment: ,Gt t t t t t tC G I I J X        where 
i p E
t t t tC C C C    
is private consumption, 
G
tI  is government investment, 
i p E
t t t tJ J J J    is total residential 
investment, and tX  are exports.  
 
2.5. Monetary policy  
The monetary authority sets the interest rate on government bonds, 1,t tr R   as a function of  
the year-on-year growth rates of GDP and of the final good price:  
     1 11 4 44 4(1 ) (1 )[ ( ln( / ) ) ( ln( / ) )] ,
r r r r r r
t t t t Y t t GDP tr r r P P GDP GDP g                  
where   is the steady state quarterly final good inflation rate; rt  is an exogenous mean zero 
AR(1) disturbance.    
 
 
 
 
                                               
16 *
tP  equals the price level in the rest of the world (RoW). The RoW economy is described by a simplified New 
Keynesian model without capital. RoW and EA output has the same trend growth rate. The foreign price level 
equals the price of EA imports. Foreign demand for EA exports is a function of foreign absorption and of the 
relative price of EA exports.  
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2.6. Fiscal policy  
There are proportional taxes on consumption, labor income and dividend income.
17
 We 
disaggregate government spending into bank support, government consumption, investment 
and transfers, in order to assess the role of each of these spending items during the crisis. 
Coenen et al. (2012) show that, in a range of macro-models, the GDP multiplier of tax cuts is 
smaller than ‘conventional’ government spending multipliers. Thus it seems especially 
interesting to compare bank support measures to conventional government spending shocks.  
In order to focus on spending changes, and in order to keep the model manageable, we 
assume that tax rates are time-invariant.
18 
Let 
s
tS  be the real government transfer to worker 
s=i,p (in final good units). The real net tax paid by worker s=i,p ( )stT equals thus her real 
consumption and labor tax liabilities, minus  the transfer .stS  Each worker receives a time-
invariant share of the total transfer 
i p
t t tS S S   that is set according to a policy rule discussed 
below.
19
  The real tax paid by the entrepreneur ( )EtT  is the sum of her real consumption and 
dividend tax liabilities.  
 Real Government consumption, investment and transfers to workers track the total 
technology trend ,tZ  and respond to deviations of the public debt and deficit from long run 
targets for these variables, according to these policy rules:    
1 1 1 1 1(1 ) - ( /( ) ) ( / ) ,
G CG CG G CG CG B B CGG
t t B t t t t t tc c c B GDP P B GDP                   (5) 
   1 1 1 1 1(1 )  - ( /( ) ) ( / ) ,
G IG G IG G IG IG B B IG
t t B t t t t t ti i i B GDP P B GDP                       (6) 
    1 1 1 1 1(1 ) - ( /( ) ) ( / ) ,
S S S S B B S
t t B t t t t t ts s s B GDP P B GDP                               (7) 
where / ,Gt t tc G Z /
G G
t t ti I Z  and /t t ts S Z  denote expenditures types normalized by  the 
‘total’ technology trend .tZ  ,
GGc i  and s  are the steady state values of the normalized 
spending types. tB  is (nominal) public debt at the end of period t-1, while 1
B
t   is the real 
deficit in  1.t  B  and 
B  are the steady state (target) values of the ratios of the debt and 
deficit to real GDP. , , ,CG IG i pt t t t     are exogenous AR(1) disturbances.  
                                               
17 Given the high and distortionary tax burden in the Euro Area (40% of GDP), a model with a lump sum tax or 
with only one type of tax would be unrealistic. 
18It might be fruitful to extend our estimated model by allowing for tax based stimulus measures. This is beyond 
the scope of the present paper, i.a. because there are no time series on marginal tax rates for the Euro Area. 
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 The normalized government transfer to the bank, /B Bt t ts S Z  is serially independent; 
this captures that idea that EA bank rescue measures were unanticipated, exceptional events.
20
 
 The law of motion of the government capital stock is 1 (1 ) ,
G G IG G
t t t tK K I      where 
G
tI  is government investment (in final good unit). 0
G
t   is an exogenous efficiency 
parameters that differs from private investment efficiency, .ti  The government investment 
deflator and the private investment deflator are given by /IG IGt t tP P   and / ,
I I
t t tP P   
respectively. The assumption that 
IG
t ti   is motivated by sizable empirical divergences 
between empirical public and private investment deflators. Capturing the dynamics of 
government purchases deflators in the model is important for an adequate representation of 
the government’s budget constraint. For the same reason, we allow the government 
consumption deflator to differ from the private CPI (we take the private CPI as the empirical 
measure of the theoretical final good price)--we assume that one unit of the final good can be 
transformed into 0CGt   units of government consumption, where 
CG
t  is an exogenous 
random variable. Thus, the government consumption deflator is / .G CGt t tP P   The period t 
government budget constraint is:  
                                
, ,
1 1 ( )
B G p G b G IG G B
t t t t t t t t t t t t t tPT B R B P P G P I PS         ,  
where 
pi E
t t t tT T T T   is the total real tax revenue, net of transfers to workers.  
 
 
3. Model solution and econometric approach 
The model is transformed into a stationary system, by normalizing real activity, aggregate 
demand components and assets using the ‘total’ technology trend tZ . We compute an 
approximate model solution by linearizing the transformed economy around its deterministic 
steady state.   
 
                                                                                                                                                  
19 The share of worker s=i,p in the total transfer equals the steady state share of the worker’s consumption in 
total consumption of the two workers.  
20 We also experimented with feedback rules under which the transfer to the bank is set as a function of bank 
losses, sovereign debt, the deficit and output. However, as our dataset only includes 4 quarters with bank support 
(as bank support was concentrated in 2009), it is impossible to reliably estimate such a decision rule (the 
estimated response coefficients are insignificant); and model fit (as measured by the marginal likelihood) 
deteriorates when the feedback rule is assumed.  
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3.1. Calibrated parameters 
One period represents one quarter in calendar time. Following the recent literature that 
estimates DSGE models (e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007)), we calibrate a subset of 
parameters to match trend features of the EA economy during the sample period (and other 
long-run data properties). We thus set the trend growth rates of GDP and of investment 
efficiency at 1.64% and 1.33% per annum, respectively (investment efficiency is measured as 
the ratio of the CPI to the private investment deflator). The state steady inflation rate is set at 
2% p.a. The elasticity of intermediate output w.r.t. labor is set at 0.65. We set the parameter 
of the public capital externality at 0.1,G   as that value ensures that, in steady state, the 
marginal product of public capital equals that of private non-residential capital (given the 
government’s decision rule for public investment). The depreciation rates of non-residential 
capital and of housing capital are set at 0.1 and 0.04 per annum (p.a.). The steady state 
foreign trade share is calibrated at a=0.16. 
The steady state real interest rates on deposits, government bonds and foreign bonds  
are set at 1.70% per annum. This pins down the (quarterly) subjective discount factor of the 
patient household: 0.9994.p   The steady state real loan rate is set at 2.20% p.a. (average  
historical EA real household mortgage rate). Following Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we set the 
discount factor of the impatient household at the markedly lower value of 0.960, in order to 
ensure that the collateral constraint always binds in the stochastic equilibrium. The subjective 
discount factor of the entrepreneur is set at 0.974, which allows the model to match the 
empirical mean ratio of private non-residential capital to annual GDP of 1.05. 
21
 (The ratio of 
total capital to GDP is 2.5).  
The steady state ratio of bank loans to annual GDP is set at 45% (which corresponds 
to the mean ratio of outstanding household loans to GDP in the EA). The steady state bank 
capital ratio is set at cr=0.08, consistent with EA data. Due to the available short time span 
for which data on EA bank asset write-downs losses are available (2007q3-2010q4), we 
calibrate the autocorrelation of losses at 0.8, and treat losses in 2011 as a latent variable.
22
 
                                               
21 Equation (1) links the steady state marginal product of capital (and thus the ratio of residential capital to 
output) to .
E   
22 We treat loan losses as exogenous. As pointed out by a referee, it would be interesting to allow for 
endogeneity of losses with respect to aggregate activity. However, the short sample on EA loan losses makes it 
impossible to reliably estimate such an endogenous effect. Also, about half of the losses experienced by EA 
banks were due to external assets (largely located in the US), as mentioned above. Hence, a substantial part of  
EA bank losses was not caused by a worsening of macroeconomic conditions in the EA.  
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The empirical literature on credit-constrained household frequently reports that the 
income share of these households is in the range of 25% or above.
23
 We set the steady state 
income share of credit-constrained households at 25%, and assume that, in steady state, the 
entrepreneur holds 50% of total net worth. 
24
 
The steady state ratios of government debt and of household mortgage debt to annual 
GDP are set at 0.7 and 0.46, respectively (which corresponds to sample means of these 
ratios). In steady state, 23% of government debt is held by the bank. Tax rates are likewise 
calibrated on sample averages (the tax rates on consumption, labor income and dividends are 
set at 0.20, 0.30 and 0.27, respectively). Government transfers to households amount to 17% 
of GDP, and 23% of sovereign debt is held by the bank, in steady state.  
 
3.2. Estimated parameters 
The remaining parameters are estimated using a Bayesian approach (Otrok (2001), Smets and 
Wouters (2007)), with quarterly time EA data for 1995q1-2011q4.
25
 We assume that all 
exogenous variables are normally (or log-normally) distributed, and independent from each 
other. The estimation uses data on EA GDP and its components, the deflators of these 
aggregates, the interest rate on mortgage loans to households, the short-term government 
bond rate, bank asset write-downs, government support for banks, the bank capital ratio, 
government consumption, investment and transfers to households, public debt, and the 
nominal exchange rate. In addition, data on GDP and the short term interest in the rest of the 
world are used. Note that the estimation uses historical data on the fiscal variables, on 
government bank support and on loan losses.
26
 The empirical measure of bank support is the 
sum of bank recapitalizations and of purchases of impaired bank assets by EA governments.
27
 
See the Appendix for further information on the data.  
Posterior estimates of key structural parameters are reported in Table 1. We set the 
prior mean duration between price and wage changes at 2 quarters; according to the posterior 
estimates, the mean durations between price and wage changes are 7 quarters and 4 quarters, 
                                               
23 See Ratto et al. (2009), Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991) and Mankiw (2000) for estimates of that shares, 
based on aggregate data.  Micro data also suggest a substantial fraction of credit constrained households 
(Souleles (2002), Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006)).  
24 According to the Luxembourg Wealth Study (Sierminska et al. (2006)), the top 10% of the population in the 
European Union owns roughly 50% of total net worth.  
25 We solve and estimate the model using the DYNARE software; see Adjemian et al. (2011) and Ratto et al. (2011). 
26 By contrast, much of the recent literature that estimates DSGE models treats the shocks as latent variables, i.e. 
no direct empirical measures of shocks are used in estimation (e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007)).  
27 EA governments also supported banks by issuing guarantees on bank liabilities, thus lowering banks’ funding 
costs. Modeling those guarantees is an interesting avenue for future research.  
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respectively. The posterior estimate of the long-run Frisch labor supply elasticity 1/ is 0.22. 
The estimates also suggest strong habit formation for consumption, housing and hours 
worked. The curvature parameter of the bank’s cost of deviating from the target bank capital 
ratio is estimated at 0.65,x   implying that a 1 percentage point rise in the bank capital ratio 
lowers the spread between the mortgage loan rate and the deposit rate by 40 basis points per 
annum, which is in line with empirical estimates of the response of the loan rate spread 
reported by Kollmann (2012).  We also find a stronger feedback from debt/GDP and 
deficit/GDP ratios to government investment than to government consumption or transfers to 
households.  
 
4. The role of bank losses and fiscal policy in the Great Recession 
Table 2 summarizes the economic performance of the EA in 2008-2010. EA (real) GDP fell 
by 4.2% in 2009, while consumption and private non-residential investment fell by 1.7% and 
20.0%, respectively; residential investment fell by 9.3%. Private non-residential investment 
was thus the demand component most adversely affected by the crisis. By contrast, 
government consumption rose by 2.5% in 2009.  This Section evaluates whether bank losses 
and government support for banks and increased government spending generate responses of 
key macro aggregates that match the behavior of those aggregates during the financial crisis. 
All model predictions are computed at posterior modes of the estimated model parameters.   
 
4.1. Impulse responses  
The estimated model predicts that a loan loss shock generates a sizable reduction in real 
activity, while government support for banks has a substantial positive effect on output and 
consumption and, especially, on private investment. A rise in government consumption also 
raises output, but crowds out consumption and (especially) investment, in the short run.  
Figure 1 shows dynamic effects of mortgage loan losses, of government support for 
the bank, of government consumption purchases, and of sovereign debt losses. In each case, 
an innovation worth 1% of steady state quarterly GDP is fed into the laws of motion of the 
relevant forcing variable. Predicted responses of GDP, private consumption, non-residential 
investment and employment are expressed in percentage deviations from steady state; 
responses of the bank capital ratio are in percentage points, while responses of spreads are in 
basis points per annum.  
 
 18 
4.1.1. Bank loan loss shock (Figure 1, Panel (a)) 
Due to the positive serial correlation of the loan loss process, an innovation to the bank loan 
loss worth 1% of quarterly steady state GDP produces a first-year loss of 0.74% of GDP, and 
a cumulative (total) loss of 1.25% of annual GDP.  The loan loss leads to a persistent fall in 
the bank’s capital; the bank capital ratio falls by 0.3 percentage points, on impact, and then 
slowly returns to the unshocked path. On impact, the loan rate spread 1 1( )
L D
t tR R   and the 
‘non-residential investment spread’ 1 1 1( ( ) )
K D
t t t tE R R     rise by about 20 and 200 basis 
points (bp) per annum, respectively. Non-residential (private) investment falls sharply            
(-2.4%, on impact). Output and employment fall too, due to the fall in investment demand 
(given price stickiness). The bank capital constraint makes it costly for the bank to take more 
deposits to smooth the stream of bank dividends—the bank thus cuts her dividend. To smooth 
her consumption, the entrepreneur hence reduces physical investment in the intermediate-
good firm. On impact, GDP falls by 0.17%--GDP continues to fall for 2 quarters after the 
shock, before slowly reverting to its pre-shock path. During the first year, GDP falls by 
0.22%. Consumption falls likewise, because of the reduction in real activity, and because 
50% of loan loss is an external loss (i.e. an wealth transfer to the rest of the world)—but 
notice that consumption falls more gradually than output and investment.  
 The cumulated asset losses of EA banks since 2007 amounted to 8.7% of annual GDP 
(see below). The model predicts that a loss shock of this cumulative magnitude generates 
reductions of GDP, non-residential investment and consumption of 1.5%, 21.7% and 0.9%, 
respectively, during the first year after the shock. These predicted responses are consistent 
with key features of the financial crisis—in particular with the sharp reduction in investment 
and the more muted fall in consumption.  
 
4.1.2. Government support for banking (Figure 1, Panel (b)) 
Qualitatively, the effects of government support for the bank are mirror-images of the 
responses to the loan loss shock. The bank reacts to the government subsidy by increasing her 
capital, and by paying a higher dividend. The entrepreneur responds to this by raising 
physical investment in the intermediate good-producing firm. Thus, government support for 
banks stabilizes a component of aggregate demand that was especially adversely affected by 
the crisis. The increase in bank capital is persistent, and it thus leads to a persistent reduction 
in the lending rate spread, and the non-residential investment spread. Thus, mortgage lending 
increases. However, the entrepreneur allocates the additional funds received by the 
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government mostly to non-residential investment and less to mortgage lending. This is a 
consequence of the fact that the bank rescue measure is a wealth transfer from workers to the 
entrepreneur (mortgage loans increase only slightly, as borrowers expect to pay higher future 
taxes). In the first quarter, the bank subsidy raises GDP and non-residential investment and 
by 0.13% and 0.7%, respectively. The effect of the bank rescue measure is persistent: during 
the first (second) year, GDP rises by 0.11% (0.04%), while non-residential investment 
increases by 0.53% (0.26%) over the same horizon.
 28
 The cumulative GDP multiplier (ratio 
of cumulated GDP changes to cumulated fiscal spending changes) of the bank rescue 
measure is 0.44 during the first year (but is greater at longer horizons). 
 
4.1.3. Government purchases (Figure 1, Panel (c)) 
The estimated law of motion of government consumption is highly persistent--an innovation 
to the law of motion of government consumption worth 1% of steady state quarterly GDP 
raises government consumption by 1.26% (1.21%) of GDP in year 1 (year 2). The cumulative 
increase in government consumption amounts to 5.10% of annual GDP.  GDP rises by 0.81% 
(0.64%) of GDP in year 1 (year 2), and employment too increase persistently. Consumption 
and investment fall by 0.05% and 1.19%, respectively in year 1. Private consumption remains 
depressed thereafter, while investment returns to its pre-shock value in year 2, and then rises 
above the unshocked paths in years 3-5 (due to the rise in employment which increases the 
marginal product of capital).
29
 The GDP multiplier is 0.64 in year 1, a value in the lower 
range of multipliers predicted by estimated New Keynesian models without banks--see, e.g., 
the models discussed in Coenen et al. (2012).
30
 A comparison with Panel (b) shows that 
government consumption has a larger impact multiplier than government support for banking, 
but that government consumption crowds out consumption and investment (in the short 
term), while bank support raises consumption and investment.
 31
  
 
                                               
28 In comparing responses in Panels (a) and (b), one should bear in mind that bank support is i.i.d.; thus Panel 
(b) shows responses to a one-time bank support; by contrast, loan losses are serially correlated and thus a given 
loss innovation triggers a much greater cumulated loss.  
29 Private consumption rises slightly in the first two quarters, because the consumption of credit constrained 
households responds positively to the increase in their labor income. Consumption falls thereafter, as the rise in 
public debt triggers a reduction in government transfers to households.  
30 Coenen et al. consider a fiscal spending shock that only lasts 2 years. With more persistent spending shock (as 
in the paper here), anticipated higher future (net) tax payments lead to a stronger and more rapid fall in private 
consumption and, thus a weaker expansion of GDP. 
31 A model variant without an operative bank capital requirement ( 0)
x   generates a slightly smaller GDP 
multiplier of government consumption. By contrast, the real effects of loan losses and of government support to 
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4.1.4. Sovereign default (Figure 1, Panel (d)) 
No sovereign default occurred during the sample period used for estimation (1995q1-
2011q4). However, partial default on the debt of an EA government (Greece) occurred in 
2012. It thus seems instructive to analyze the consequences of a sovereign debt default, using 
the model.  The model predicts that the consequences of a default hinge crucially on whether 
the government defaults on debt that is held by the bank or on debt held by the (patient) 
household. The response to a default on debt closely resemble the consequences of a loss on 
mortgage loans: there is a significant and persistent fall in bank capital, a rise in spreads, and 
a fall in GDP, employment and investment.
32
  Figure 1, Panel (d), considers a loss on bank-
held sovereign debt which is of the same size and time profile as the loss shock on mortgage 
loans discussed above (i.e. the cumulated default amounts to 1.25% of annual GDP). In the 
first year, the sovereign loss triggers a 0.29% (2.28%) fall in GDP (investment). By contrast, 
a default that only affects sovereign debt held by the (patient) household hardly affects real 
activity—i.e. Ricardian equivalence then holds approximately. (Obviously, this assumes that 
default does not trigger subsequent financing restrictions for the government.) 
 
4.2. EA banking shocks and fiscal policy in the financial crisis: historical decompositions 
Figure 2 plots year-on-year (YoY) growth rates of EA GDP, private non-residential 
investment and private consumption, as well as the public debt/GDP ratio, in 2007-2011. 
(The mean 1995-2011 YoY growth rates (mean debt/GDP) have been subtracted from each 
of the plotted growth rate (debt/GDP) series.) The Figure also shows the contributions of 
banking and fiscal shocks to the historical series.  
 
4.2.1. Bank losses, bank rescue measures and innovations to conventional fiscal instruments 
Estimates of EA bank asset write-downs in the period 2007-2011 are shown in Figure 3. 
Write-downs were highest in 2009, amounting to 4.5% of GDP. Cumulated 2007-2011 write-
downs amount to 8.7% of 2009 GDP. EA Bank rescue measures during the financial crisis 
were likewise concentrated in the year 2009 (and especially in the second part of 2009). 
Table 3 documents that government purchases of impaired (‘toxic’) assets by banks and bank 
recapitalisations amounted to 2.84% and 1.88%, respectively, of EA GDP in 2009. Total 
                                                                                                                                                  
banks are negligible when 0x  , as then the lending spread (and the non-residential investment spread) are 
unaffected by shocks to the bank’s capital (up to a first-order approximation).   
32A key difference between the sovereign loss and the mortgage loss shock (as discussed above), is that 50% of 
the latter falls on foreign bonds. By contrast, the sovereign loss shock is a wealth transfer within the EA 
economy; that redistributive nature of the shock dampens the negative aggregate consumption response. 
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government support for banks thus amounted to 4.7% of GDP in 2009. (As mentioned above, 
the estimation uses the sum of impaired asset purchases and of bank recapitalizations as a 
measure of bank support.) 
Figure 4 plots the components of EA government consumption, government 
investment and transfers to households (normalized by an exponential trend fitted to GDP) 
that are solely accounted for by current and past innovations to the corresponding fiscal 
spending rules (see (5)-(7)). The Figure shows that these ‘non-systematic’ components of 
government consumption and transfers both rose strongly during the crisis, namely by about 
2% of trend GDP, a clear indication of an expansionary fiscal stance. By contrast, non-
systematic public investment spending rose only slightly in 2008-2011 (by less than 0.5% of 
GDP). The cumulative fiscal impulses in 2008-2011 amounted to 9.8% of trend GDP (of 
which 5.0%, 4.5% and 0.3%, respectively, were due to higher government consumption, 
transfers to households, and government investment). The average conventional fiscal 
impulse thus amounted to 2.6% of GDP, per year, in 2008-2011.
33
  
 
4.2.2. Historical decompositions of real activity and public debt 
Figure 2 shows the contributions of different types of shocks to the historical time series of 
GDP, private non-residential investment, consumption (YoY growth rates), and of the public 
debt/GDP ratio. Specifically, we decompose the historical series into components due to: (i) 
fiscal shocks other than transfers (‘Fiscal excluding transfers’); (ii) ‘Transfers to households’; 
(iii) ‘Bank support’; (iv) ‘Bank asset losses’. The remainder (‘Other’) captures the effect of 
all other shocks. 
The ‘Fiscal, excl. transfers’ and ‘Transfers’ components of the historical series 
correspond to predicted paths that obtain when residuals of the fitted fiscal spending rules are 
fed into the model. The ‘Bank support’ and ‘Bank asset losses’ components correspond to 
predicted series that are generated when the historical bank losses and bank support payments 
(Figure 3, Table 3) are fed into the model.  
Our model suggests that, between late 2007 and the end of 2009, bank losses exerted 
a strong negative influence on EA bank capital, bank lending and real activity.
 34
 The Bank 
                                               
33 These estimates of fiscal stimulus, based on estimated non-systematic innovations,  include the workings of 
automatic stabilisers, and are larger than the discretionary fiscal measures announced by EA governments in 
early 2009 (European Economic Recovery Plan): the discretionary measures for 2009 and 2010 amounted to 
0.83% and 0.72% of EA GDP, respectively (Coenen et al., 2012). 
34 The  ECB’s Euro Area bank lending survey (BLS) suggests a strong tightening of credit conditions that began 
in the second half of 2007, and culminated in late 2008 (Lehman collapse). Costs related to bank capital 
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losses explain 26% of the fall in EA GDP and consumption, and 78% of the fall in EA non-
residential investment, between 2007q1 and 2009q1. Consistent with the impulse responses 
discussed above, we thus find that investment is especially sensitive to loan loss shocks. The 
bank support measures in 2009 had a noticeable stabilizing effect on GDP and, especially, on 
consumption and investment. Bank support essentially off-set the effect of bank losses on 
GDP, in 2009. As bank support was concentrated in 2009, the absence of bank support in 
2010 shows up as a negative contribution to GDP, consumption and investment YoY growth 
in 2010.  The rise in transfers to households had a noticeable stabilizing effect on 
consumption, but hardly affected GDP and investment. Increased government consumption 
and investment helped to stabilize GDP in 2008-2009, but crowded out consumption, and had 
a slight negligible effect on investment.  
The public debt/GDP ratio increased by about 20 percentage points in 2008-2011. 
Bank support accounts for about 18% of that rise in the debt/GDP ratio, while  fiscal shocks 
explain 33% of the increase. Together, the fiscal and  bank-related shocks account for about 
half of the rise in the debt/GDP ratio. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the impact of Euro Area (EA) bank asset losses, government support 
for banks, and conventional fiscal stimulus measures, using an estimated New Keynesian 
model with a bank. Our model traces out a transmission channel of these shocks to the EA 
real economy which is consistent with key features of the recent financial crisis, in particular 
with the strong decline of non-residential investment. Bank losses explain about a quarter of 
the fall in EA GDP and consumption in 2007-2009, and more than three quarter of the fall in 
private non-residential investment. Government support for banks was an effective tool for 
stabilizing output and consumption and, especially, physical investment, the component of 
aggregate demand most adversely affected by the financial crisis. The sizable increase in 
government purchases during the crisis helped to stabilize GDP, but crowded out 
consumption and investment. Higher transfers to households raised private consumption, but 
hardly affected GDP and investment.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
positions, as well as risks on collateral demanded and expectations regarding economic conditions, are reported 
by a significant fraction of banks as having contributed to that tightening.  
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DATA APPENDIX  
A1. The following variables are used as observables 
 
Euro Area variables:  
● GDP, private consumption, government consumption, private non-residential investment, 
residential investment, government investment, net exports, employment. The estimation uses 
there variables at constant prices, plus corresponding deflators (where appropriate). As 
empirical measures of investment efficiency shocks, we use the ratios of private non-
residential investment deflators, of private residential investment deflators, and of 
government investment, to the CPI.   
● Residential property prices (new and existing dwellings) 
● Bank capital to asset ratio; mortgage loans to households; bank write-downs (see below); 
government support for banks (see below).   
● Short term government bond rate; household mortgage interest rate (available since 2003 
only).   
● Nominal government transfers to households (Paredes et al. (2009) database, with updates 
by authors); nominal government debt; nominal government interest payments 
 
Rest-of-world variables:  
Trade weighted average of GDP of 41 EA trading partners (current and constant prices); 
Nominal effective exchange rate (trade weighted average of 41 bilateral EA-trading partner 
exchange rates). US federal funds rate (used as a proxy of the world interest rate).  
 
Sources: DG ECFIN, ECB Monthly Bulletin, Eurostat national accounts, IMF International 
Financial Statistics, US Federal Reserve, Bloomberg.    
 
A2. Estimates of bank asset losses and of government support for banks in the EA 
To construct an estimate of EA bank losses, we compute the sum of the write-downs of the 
36 largest EA banks, as reported by Bloomberg (see Roeger and in’t Veld (2012)). That data 
is available for the period 2007q3-2010q4. These 36 banks account for 80% of total EA bank 
assets. We multiplied aggregate write-downs for these banks by a factor 1/0.8 to construct an 
estimate of total EA bank write-downs, and we added EA government purchases of impaired 
bank assets to the scaled series (see below). The estimation uses the resulting 2007q3-2010q4 
series, as an empirical measure of EA bank loan losses. We treat loan losses in 2011 as a 
latent variable. The loan losses (with model implied estimates for 2011) are shown in Figure 4.  
 Government support for banks during the financial crisis were concentrated in the 
year 2009 (Laeven and Valencia (2011)). Data on government support for banks in 2009 are 
reported in Table 3. (Source: European Commission services, based on surveys of euro area 
member states.) The bank support measures included recapitalizations (‘capital injections into 
financial institutions’) and purchases of impaired (‘toxic’) assets by governments (‘impaired 
asset relief mechanisms’). The estimation uses the sum of recapitalizations and purchases of 
impaired assets by EA governments (in 2009) as an empirical measure of the theoretical bank 
rescue measure. Bank losses are assumed to equal zero, in the rest of the sample period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
Table 1. Prior and posterior distributions of key model parameters  
                                    Prior distributions                  Posterior distributions 
 
Parameters  Distrib.       mean          s.d.      mode         s.d. 
(1)                                      (2)                        (3)               (4)              (5 )                (6) 
Household preferences 
   Gamma 3.50 1.40 4.621 1.193 
Ch   Beta 0.70 0.10 0.937 0.010 
Hh   Beta 0.50 0.20 0.778 0.197 
Nh   Beta 0.70 0.10 0.922 0.019 
 
Bank capital constraint 
x   Gamma 0.60 0.16 0.649 0.164 
 
Fiscal policy rules 
CG   Beta 0.50 0.20 0.945 0.031 
CG
B   Gamma 0.02 0.01 0.006 0.003 
CG
  
 Gamma 0.02 0.01 0.010 0.006 
IG   Beta 0.50 0.20 0.191 0.137 
IG
B  Gamma 0.02 0.01 0.014 0.004 
IG
  
Gamma 0.02 0.01 0.012 0.006 
S   Beta 0.50 0.20 0.667 0.181 
S
B  Gamma 0.02 0.01 0.007 0.005 
S
  
Gamma 0.02 0.01 0.008 0.005 
 
Monetary policy rules 
r   Beta 0.50 0.15 0.884 0.026 
r
   Gamma 2.00 0.60 2.008 0.516 
r
Y   Gamma 1.00 0.40 1.077 0.286 
 
 
Notes: Cols. (1) lists the parameters; Col. (2) indicates the distribution function of the prior. Cols. (3) 
and (4) show the means and the standard deviations (s.d.) of the prior distributions of the listed 
parameters, respectively. Cols. (5) and (6) report means and standard deviations of the posterior 
parameter distributions. Posterior distributions are computed using the Random Walk Metropolis 
algorithm.    
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Table 2: Euro Area - Financial Crisis 2008-2010: 
 Annual growth rates 
 2008 2009 2010 
GDP  0.5 -4.2 1.8 
Gov. Consumption  2.3 2.5 0.5 
Consumption  0.7 -1.7 0.8 
Non-residential investment  2.3 -20.0 4.3 
Residential Investment 1.2 -9.3 -5.2 
Employment  0.9 -1.9 -0.5 
 
 
Table 3: EA government support for banks (cumulative, as % of GDP) 
 Feb-09 May-09 Aug-09 Dec-09 
Purchases of 
impaired bank 
assets 0.43 0.45 0.75 2.84 
Recapitalizations 1.09 1.45 1.67 1.88 
Total bank aid  1.52 1.90 2.42 4.72 
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Figure 1. Dynamic effects of shocks   
 
(a) Innovation to bank loan loss (1% of quarterly GDP) 
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(b) One-time government support for bank (1% of quarterly GDP) 
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(c) Innovation to government consumption rule (1% of quarterly GDP) 
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(d) Innovation to default on sovereign debt held by the bank (1% of quarterly GDP) 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Dynamic responses to exogenous shocks are shown. Panel (a): innovation to law of 
motion of bank loan loss; Panel (b): one-time bank aid; Panel (c): innovation to policy rule 
for government purchases; Panel (c): loss to sovereign debt held by bank of same magnitude 
as loan loss shock. In all panels, the innovation represents 1% of GDP.  
     Responses of GDP, consumption (all private agents) and non-residential investment, 
employment are expressed as % deviation from the deterministic steady state. Responses of 
the bank capital ratio are expressed in percentage points. Responses of spreads are in basis 
points per annum.  
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Figure 2. Historical decompositions of Euro Area variables 
 
(a) YoY GDP growth (demeaned) 
 
 
 
 
(b) YoY Consumption growth (demeaned) 
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(c) YoY private non-residential investment growth (demeaned) 
 
 
 
(d) Debt to GDP ratio (demeaned) 
 
 
 
Note: Solid lines with dots show year-on-year (YoY) growth rates of EA GDP (Panel (a)), of 
private consumption (b) and of private non-residential investment (c), and the public debt 
ratio (Panel (d)), in 2007q1-2011q4. Mean YoY growth rates during the model estimation 
sample (1995-2011) are subtracted from plotted growth rates; the 1995-2011 mean debt/GDP 
ratio is subtracted from the plotted debt/GDP series.  
   The bars show the contributions of different types of shocks to the historical series.  
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Figure 3--EA bank asset write-downs (as share of trend of quarterly GDP) 
 
 
Note: values shown for 2011 (hashed shaded bars) are estimated through the lens of the 
model. 
 
 
 
Figure 4—Non-systematic components of fiscal variables (as share of trend of quarterly GDP) 
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Note: The Figure plots the components of EA government consumption, government 
investment and transfers to households (normalized by an exponential trend fitted to quarterly 
GDP) that are accounted for by current and past innovations to the corresponding fiscal 
spending rules (see (5)-(7)).   
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